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The  progress  of  privatisation,  broadly  understood  to 
include  both  the  transfer  of state assets  to  private  owners 
and  the  autonomous  growth  of  old  and  new  private 
enterprises,  depends  crucially  on  a  variety  of  functions  to 
be  performed  by  banks  and  other  financial  intermediaries. 
These  functions  clearly  are  exceptionally  important  in  a 
transitional  economy  because  of  the  particularly  large 
initial  size  of  the  state sector,  and  the  systemic  features 
of both the old and the transitional economic  regimes. 
This  paper discusses  seven  such  functions.  Two  of  them 
are  strictly  connected  with  typical  transitional  problems, 
namely: 
i)  assisting  the  financial  restructuring  of  state 
enterprises to be privatised; 
ii)  financing  private  acquisitions  of  state  assets, 
without  undue  deflationary or inflationary effects. 
Two  of  the  functions  considered  here  are  general  forms  of 
credit intermediation for the provision of risk capital: 
iii)  financing  the  restructuring  of  inappropriate 
productive capacity,  whether before or after privatisation; 
iv)  financing  investment  in  new  capacity  (including  the 
working  capital  necessary  to  operate  it)  by  existing  and 
especially by  new  enterprises. 
The  other  three  functions  involve  the  discipline  role  of 
credit relations;  they  are  routinely exercised  in any  market 
economy  but  are particularly  important during  the transition 
to such  an  economy,  to make privatisation work: 
v)  enforcing,  through  the  privatisation  of  state  banks 
themselves,  financial  discipline  in  enterprises  formerly 
subject  to  "soft  budget  constraints"  (of  the  kind  discussed 
by  Kornai  1980,  1986); 
vi)  exercising  control  over  enterprise  management,  by 
monitoring  and  voting  on  behalf  of  clients,  and  possibly 
even  of  state  agencies,  as  well  as  on  their  own  behalf  as 
shareholders; 
vii)  funding  financial  transactions  essential  to  the 
discipline  function  of  stock  markets,  such  as  buy-outs  or 
takeovers. 
The  paper  stresses  the  crucial  importance  of  these 
functions  and  the  need  to  implement  essential  preconditions 
and desirable accompanying  reforms. 2.  Essential preconditions and  accompanyinq reforms. 
We  presume  that  the  transitional  economy  under 
consideration  has  already  achieved  market  balance,  the 
introduction  of  private  ownership  legislation  and  the 
setting up  of financial markets  for bonds  and shares. 
There  are  also  other  accompanying  reforms,  highly 
desirable if not outright indispensable.  They  include: 
the  establishment  of  a  regulatory  framework,  with 
provisions  for  the  disclosure  of  information,  prudential 
controls  ~  limiting  risk-taking  by  banks,  control  of 
monopolistic  concentration  and  practices,  prevention  of 
fraud.  This  is  particularly  important  in  the  absence  of 
jurisprudence  and  tradition,  in  economies  subject  to 
considerable  uncertainties  and  inherent  macroeconomic 
instability,  and  lack of competition in  banking.~ 
the  enforcement  of  liquidation  and  bankruptcy 
procedures  ;  .d 
the  overhauling  of  the  system  of  penalties  and 
rewards  for  state enterprise managers,  i.e.  their linking to 
enterprise  short  term  profitability  and  longer  term 
performance; 
- a  suitable  infrastructure  of  communications  and  data 
processing facilities; 
- the provision of  training.~ 
~.  Here  the  task  is  made  easier  by  the  recent 
establishment  of  international  standards,  such  as  the  Basle 
Convergence  Agreement  on  capital  standards  (1988),  and  the 
EC  directives  on  own  funds  and  on  solvency  ratios  (1989) 
which  are  to  be  adopted  by  member  states  by  1-1-1993. 
However,  the  early  temporary  enforcement  of  simpler,  less 
stringent standards might be in order. 
~- In  Poland,  for  instance,  until  1992  most  prudential 
regulations  were  not  binding,  but  were  in  the  form  of 
recommendations  by  the  National  Bank  of  Poland.  Poland 
still  misses  a  law  on  collateral  (Sommariva  and  Miurin, 
1992). 
_d.  It has  been  argued  that  in  Hungary  the  "queueing" 
system,  whereby  bank  loans  are  given  a  prior  claim  on 
enterprise assets  with  respect  to suppliers'  credit,  reduces 
the  incentive  to  initiate  bankruptcy  proceedings  for  both 
groups  of  creditors  (Estrin  et  al.,  1992).  On  "creditor 
passivity"  in  enforcing  liquidation  and  bankruptcy 
procedures see Mitchell  1992. 
~.  Beside  the  establishment of  specialised institutes, 
2 These  points  should  not  be  controversial:  obviously  the 
contribution  of  banks  to  privatisation  progress  is 
handicapped  in  a  system  where  unviable,  negative-value-added 
activities  are  ·kept  artificially  alive  by  credit;  where 
whatever  entrepreneurial  ability  potentially  supplied  by 
state  enterprise  managers·  is  hampered  by  an  outdated 
incentive  system;  where  banks  can  be  founded  by  persons with 
a  criminal  record,  and  anybody  can  issue  nicely  printed 
pieces  of  paper  and  sell  them  to the  public;  where  it takes 
months  to  clear  a  cheque,  while  in the  meantime  interest  is 
being  earned  both  on  the  account  on  which  the  cheque  is 
being  drawn,  and  on  the  account  to which  the cheque  is being 
credited;  where  commercial  banks  and  the Ministry of  Finance 
are  staffed  by  personnel  redeployed  from  the  former  Central 
Planning  Commission.  These  are  real,  not  hypothetical 
examples.  In  what  follows  it  is  presumed  that  these 
problems  have  already been tackled to a  satisfactory extent. 
However,  for  banks  to  be  able  to  play  a  role  in  the 
privatisation  process  it  is  necessary  for  some  other 
specific  preconditions  to  be  satisfied,  consisting  in  the 
dismantling  of  those  features  of  the  monetary  and  financial 
system  strictly  associated  with  central  planning  (for  an 
illustration  of  those  features  see  Arnold  1937,  Garvy  1966, 
Grossman  1968,  Nuti  1989  and  1992a). 
These  features  of the old  system,  which  tend to survive 
during the transition,  are: 
i)  The  segmentation of monetary circuits into cash  (and 
accounts  convertible  into  cash,  for  transactions  with  and 
among  the  population)  and  non-cash  (for  transactions 
involving  enterprises  andjor  other  government  institutions). 
Thus  the  two  circuits must  be  integrated,  with the  two  types 
of  money  being  freely transferable.  One  might  have  expected 
this  integration  as  a  matter  of  course,  but  in  reality  it 
has  been  often  overlooked.  In  all  the  former  Soviet 
republics,  still in mid-1992,  such  segmentation  - a  residual 
vestige  of  the  old  system  - is  still  present:  there  is  a 
shortage  of  banknotes,  for  a  combination  of  technical 
difficulties  (the  capacity  constraints  in  the  printing  of 
money  at  times  of  sudden  inflation)  and  grotesquely 
misguided  policy  (the  belief  that  inflation  can  be 
controlled  by  making  banknotes  scarce,  rather  than 
restricting  the  overall  money  supply  by  acting  on  the 
factors  that  raise  it).  In  such  conditions  there  is at the 
same  time  an  overhang  of  non-cash  money  and  a  curious 
which  are  being  set  up  throughout  the  area,  a  particularly 
effective  form  of  training  appears  to  be  the  formation  of 
joint venture  banks  and,  in  Poland,  the  "twinning"  of  seven 
state  banks  with  major  western  banks  for  the  purpose  of 
transferring  modern  banking  technology.  This  kind  of  links 
is expected to lead  in due  course to participation in  shared 
activities and  joint ventures. 
3 "under-hang"  of  cash;  the  unavoidable  eventual  unification 
of  the  two  circuits is  bound  to  have  an  inflationary effect 
when  it  occurs.  Until  such  a  unification  current  prices 
cannot  be  regarded  as  equilibrium  prices  even  if  markets 
clear,  and  without  equilibrium  prices  both  the  operation  of 
banks  and  the  whole  privatisation  process  cannot  be  guided 
by  markets.  In  the  other  transitional  economies  this 
segmentation  has  disappeared,  but  there  is  still  a  certain 
residual  segmentation  in  the  banking  system,  between  banks 
dealing primarily with households or with enterprises. 
ii)  The  monopolistic  concentration of all credit in the 
Central  Bank  and  in the monopolistic  segments  of the  banking 
system  which  strictly  depend  directly  from  it  (such  as  an 
Investment  Bank,  an  External  Relations  Bank,  a  Bank  for 
Agriculture,  etcetera;  the  Central  Bank  depended  strictly 
from  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  and  other  banks  were  subject 
not  to  reserve  requirements  but to direct  instructions).  In 
the  old  system,  which  took  shape  in  the  Soviet  Union  in 
1928-32,  the  Central  Bank  was  not  only  the  lender  of  last 
resort  but  the  only  lender,  thus  dubbed  "Monobank";  such  a 
monopoly  of  credit  was  reinforced  by  the  strict prohibition 
of  inter-enterprise credit.  Thus  it is absolutely essential 
to  transfer all  functions  other  than  central  banking  to  new 
state and  private  commercial  banks  and  other  intermediaries, 
and  to  give  a  degree  of  independence  to  the  Central  Bank 
(now  answerable  to  Parliament  almost  everywhere  in  the 
area). 
This  process  of  credit  de-monopolisation  was  pioneered 
by  Hungary,  though  only  as  recently  as  1987  (see  Blejer-
Sagari  1991;  Hungarian  State  Banking  Supervision  1991)  ,2, 
and  has  now  been  completed  everywhere  in  the  transitional 
,2.  On  1  January  1987  the  National  Bank  of  Hungary 
hived  off  its credit activities  by  transforming  its  lending 
directorates  and  some  local  branches  into  associated  but 
separate  banks,  soon  joined  by  other  banks  with  substantial 
foreign  participation.  An  obligatory  reserve  ratio  of  20 
percent  was  established  for  demand  deposits  and  10  percent 
of  time  deposits;  the  discount  rate,  which  until  the  end  of 
1984  was  decided  by  the  government,  was  put  under  the 
control  of  the  President  of  the  Central  Bank.  A  Law  on 
bankruptcy  (1986)  gave  initiative  to  creditors  and 
established  rapid  proceedings.  A  market  for  share  issues  by 
private  and  state enterprises  to the  general  public  was  set 
up  from  1-1-1989.  The  1988  Law  on  the  Transformation  of 
Enterprises  and  subsequent  legislation  laid  the  foundation 
for  the  privatisation  of  state  enterprises  (which  had 
occurred  spontaneously  since  the  mid-1980s);  in  June  1991  a 
bank  privatisation  plan  was  announced,  which  may  permit 
foreign  ownership  of  up  to  20  per  cent  of  even  the  largest 
commercial  banks.  However  the  growth  of the private sector, 
especially  in  banking  and  financial  activities,  has 
proceeded  mostly  through  new  institutions  rather  than 
through privatisation of the state sector. 
4 economies  of  Central  Eastern  Europe  (except  for  Albania) . .§. 
While  the  former  Monobank  legal  monopoly  has  been  broken,  a 
de  facto  state  monopolistic  position  has  been  preserved. 
The  five  largest  state-owned  Hungarian  banks  account  for  90 
per  cent  of  total  assets.  In  Poland  the  nine  state 
commercial  banks  and  six .specialised  state  banks  still 
account  for  95  pr  cent  of  total  assets  (their  deposits  are 
still  covered  by  a  state  guarantee) •  In  the  CSFR  the 
Comercni  Bank  and  the  General  Credit  Bank  still  enjoy  a 
virtual monopoly  in their respective republics.  Such  degree 
of  monopolistic  concentration  of  banks  in  the  state  sector 
suggests  the  need  for  an  early privatisation of  state  banks 
to guarantee competition. 
iii)  The  automatic  granting  of  credit  to  enterprises 
and  other  state  organisations,  for  the  conduct  of  their 
statutory  activities,  for  the  covering  of  losses  and  the 
payment  of  taxes.  This  facility  made  enterprises  budget 
constraints  "soft"  (Kornai  1980,  1986)  or,  more  precisely, 
sufficiently elastic relatively to  insufficiently high  price 
increases  as  to  preserve  a  state  of  excess  demand  and  to 
lessen incentives to cut costs and  improve efficiency. 
Such  automatic  credit  effectively  contained  a  hidden 
subsidy  (in  addition  to  open  subsidies  also  obtained  by 
enterprises);  often all  or  part of  the state  budget  deficit 
could  be  made  invisible  and  financed  through  enterprises 
borrowing  automatically  in  order  to  pay  taxes.  Such  a 
practice  has  not  disappeared  altogether:  the  automatic 
.§..  In  Poland  this  kind  of  banking  reform  was 
implemented  at  the  beginning  of  1989;  there  are  over  one 
hundred  licensed  private  banks,  of  which  about  50  currently 
operating,  and  another  8  banks  with  foreign  participation; 
two  state  banks,  the  Bank  Slaski  and  the  Wielopolski  Bank 
Kredytowy,  have  been  selected for privatisation in 1992.  In 
Bulgaria the banking sector was  reformed at the  end  of  1989; 
there  are  now  80  commercial  banks  including  50  former 
branches of the National  Bank. 
In the  CSFR  similar reforms  were  introduced  in  1990-91; 
the  Statni  Bank  functions  other  than  central  banking  were 
attributed  to  the  Komercni  Bank  in  the  Czech  Republic  and 
the General  Credit  Bank  in the  Slovak Republic,  which  are to 
be  privatised  (though  the  government  will retain  a  40-50  per 
cent  stake);  new  banks  were  encouraged  and  all  banks 
permitted to act as universal banks. 
In  Romania  the  banking  reform  took place  in April  1991; 
there  are  now  five  state-owned  banks  and  four  main  private 
banks  (two  of  which  have  a  cooperative  form) •  In  Albania 
three  commercial  banks  were  created  out  of  state 
institutions in the  second half of  1991  and  one  private bank 
has  been  licensed,  but  otherwise  the  reform  of  the  banking 
system  is  lagging  behind.  (For  a  review  of  banking  reform 
progress to date,  see Sommariva  and Miurin,  1992). 
5 build-up  of  enterprise  payment  arrears  towards  the  banking 
system,  and  of  tax  arrears  towards  the  budget  (whether 
negotiated  or  de  facto;  including  social  security  payments) 
are  still  a  deplorable  feature,  for  instance,  of  the  Polish 
economy.  Enterprise arrears  towards  the  banking  system  (140 
trillion zlotys  in  Poland  in  mid-1992,  of  which  40  per  cent 
are  regarded  as  bad  loans;  see  Jezewski  1992)  amount  to 
direct  credit  expansion,  whereas  tax-arrears  and  social 
security arrears  contribute to monetary  expansion  indirectly 
by  raising  government  borrowing  requirements.  Moreover, 
while  on  the whole  credit extension to state enterprises may 
have  been  severely  constrained,  there  are  still enterprises 
whose unprofitable activity is sustained by credit. 
It  is  essential  that  these  forms  of  automatic  credit 
should  be  totally  replaced  by  contractual  loans  based  on 
credit-worthiness.  Any  government  support  to  enterprises, 
which  might  very  well  be  justified  by  preoccupations  about 
employment,  or  by  the desirability of protecting those  among 
unprofitable  activities  which  still  make  a  positive 
contribution  to  value  added,  should  be  replaced  by  direct 
subsidies  from  the  state  budget  (e.g.  wage  subsidies,  or 
grants  2),  or  by  other  instruments  (e.g.  tariffs).  The 
undesirability  of  subsidies  and  tariffs  on  other  grounds 
should be  no  reason to replace  them  by  credits,  which  are  no 
more desirable but are less transparent. 
Another  form  of  automatic  credit  has  been  the  rapid 
build-up  of  large  scale  payments  arrears  between 
enterprises.  This  problem  is  typical  of  the  transition, 
when  the  relaxation  of  the  former  prohibition  of  inter-
enterprise  credit  is  not  yet  accompanied  by  the  parallel 
enforcement  of  liquidation  and  bankruptcy  procedures.  Thus 
it  is  reported  that  in  the  CSFR  during  1989-91  inter-
enterprise  credit  grew  from  7  bn  crowns  to  155  bn  crowns, 
while  bank  credit to  state enterprises  as  a  whole  increased 
only  from  531  bn  crowns  to  611  bn  crowns;  in  Poland  the 
ratio  of  inter-enterprise  credit  to  bank  credit  increased 
from  70%  at  end-1988  to  over  150%  in  1990  (Begg  and  Partes, 
1992;  for  Hungary,  see  Kornai  1992);  in Poland  in 1991,  at a 
time  of  monetary  austerity,  interenterprise  payments  arrears 
appear  to  have  increased  by  70  per  cent;  by  mid-1992  they 
amounted  to  a  staggering  200  trillion  zlotys  (Jezewski, 
1992) .  In  Russia  in  the  first  six  months  of  1992  inter-
enterprise arrears  have  increased  from  30  bn  roubles  to over 
2,000  bn  roubles. 
]_.  Such  grants  are  similar  to  the  EFLs  (External 
Financing  Limits,  on  total  cash  usable  from  any  source)  or 
"cash  limits"  on  state enterprises  operated  in the  UK  (Nuti, 
1991b);  they  should  be  "fixed annually  in advance,  and  fully 
budgeted  in  the  aggregate  fiscal  projections  which  are  the 
subject  of  conditionality  in  international  loans  from  the 
IMF  and  others"  (Begg  and Partes,  1992). 
6 (2) 
The  build-up  of  inter-enterprise  arrears  cannot  be 
regarded,  as  it is  often  suggested  (for  instance,  by  Estrin 
et  al.  ~),  as  equivalent  to  monetary  expansion,  as  in  the 
consolidated  accounts  of the  enterprise sector these arrears 
cancel  out;  ·it  does,  however,  lead  to  the  forced 
redistribution  of  liquidity  from  "good"  to  "bad" 
enterprises;  to  pressure  on  banks  for  the  extension  of 
credit  to  those  enterprises  to  whom  net  arrears  are  owed 
(Begg  and  Portes,  1992);  and  to  the  build-up  of  bad  debts 
which  are  an  obstacle  to  privatisation,  directly  and 
indirectly  (e.g.  through  greater difficulties  in performance 
assessment  and  in  net  assets  valuation) . .2,  The  solution  of 
this  typical  problem  of  the  transitional  economy  requires 
the  involvement  of  the  banking  sector  and  is  an  additional 
argument  for the early privatisation of banks. 
3.  Financial restructuring of state enterprises. 
For  those  enterprises  which  are  not  to  be  closed  down, 
and  which  therefore  have  productive  assets  that  have  a 
positive  present  value'\ greater  than  the  value  they  would 
have  in  alternative  uses,  financial  restructuring  involves 
the cancellation,  through  a  state grant or  a  book  operation, 
of  any  outstanding  debt  in  excess  of  that  positive  present 
value,  and  an  injection  of  credit  adequate  to  finance 
working  capital  for the best scale  of operation.  In theory, 
financial  restructuring  should  make  no  difference:  the 
higher  the  liabilities  of  the  enterprise  to  be  privatised, 
the  lower  the price paid by  the  investor,  who  then  should  be 
able  to  raise  the  capital  necessary  to  restructuring.  In 
~- 11  there  was  no  control  over  money  created  by 
non-payment",  which  is  regarded  as  "in  fact  a  money 
substitute"  (Estrin  et  al.,  1992) .  It  is  worth  stressing 
that  wages  cannot  be  paid  out  of  interenterprise  credit; 
enterprises  obtaining  forced  or  voluntary  credit  from  other 
enterprises are still constrained by  their cash  flow  for  the 
payment  of  wages,  and  so  is  the  consolidated  enterprise 
sector  . 
.2..  Strictly  speaking  one  should  distinguish  between 
that  subset  of  inter-enterprise  arrears  which  could  be 
multilaterally  cleared  (much  of  which  is  bound  to  have  been 
voluntarily  extended  by  enterprises  to  their  customers)  and 
therefore  can  be  eliminated  through  a  modest  injection  of 
liquidity,  and  the  remaining  subset.  This,  in turn,  is made 
up  of  "good  loans",  i.e.  credit extended to enterprises with 
sufficient  though  illiquid  assets  to  cover  them,  and  "bad 
loans" ,  i.e.  forced  credit  extended  de  facto  to  insolvent 
unviable  enterprises,  which  are  the  irreducible  core  of  the 
problem.  A  common  form  of  arrears  is  the  non-payment  of 
supplies  by  public utilities.  On  the  question of enterprise 
arrears  I  have  benefited  from  discussions  with  Dariusz 
Rosati  and Richard Portes. 
7 practice,  however,  restructuring  is  necessary  in  order  to 
avoid  having  to  pay  investors  to  take  over  an  enterprise  as 
it stands  when  its  net  present  value  including  liabilities 
is  negative  (though,  as  we  have  postulated,  the  net  present 
value  of  the  underlying  productive  assets  is  positive  and 
the  enterprise  is  viable) •  Paying  the  new  owners  to  take 
over  net  liabilities  seems  a  bad  idea,  as  new  owners  can 
also  go  bankrupt  and  default  on  those  same  liabilities. 
Moreover,  within  the  state  sector  financial  restructuring 
can  be  undertaken· administratively,  for  instance taking  over 
the  bad  credits  of  enterprises  and  banks  and  recapitalising 
them,  instead  of  leaving  to  their  new  owners  the  time  and 
cost burden of going through  judicial procedures. 
The  best  way  of  dealing  with  inter-enterprise  payments 
arrears is that of making  debt  tradable.  In this way,  first 
that  part  of  payments  arrears  which  involves  the  same 
enterprises  both  as  creditors  and  debtors  should  be  netted 
out through transfers of debt at par among  them,  leaving out 
only  the  arrears  of  net  debtors.  Then,  trading  net  arrears 
within  the  enterprise  sector  effectively  makes  that  debt 
legal  tender  in  transactions  with  the  debtor  enterprises 
that  have  issued  it,  thus  draining  the  cash  flow  of 
insolvent  enterprises  and  revealing  insolvency  cases  through 
the  appearance  of  a  discount  in  the  secondary  retrading  of 
debt.  Thus  the  part  of  inter-enterprise  arrears  which 
consists  of  bad  debts  would  come  to  the  surface.  Net 
creditor  enterprises,  if otherwise  viable,  would  have  to  be 
recapitalised,  not  from  credit  but  from  the  state  budget  or 
from  a  specialised state agency  taking over those  bad  debts. 
Indeed,  banks  might  be  barred  or  discouraged  from  handling 
inter-enterprise  old  debt  at  all,  in  order  not  to  add  to 
their stock of bad  loans. 
A  similar  process  for  the  banks  themselves  is  a 
necessary  complement  of  their  privatisation:  their  balance 
sheets  must  be  cleaned  of  the  bad  loans  which  in most  cases 
make  their  net  worth  actually  negative  and  which,  through 
the  automatic  credit  involved  in  the  capitalisation  of 
interest,  limit  the  amounts  of  new  lending  to  viable 
enterprises  and  raises  intermediation margins  (Sommariva  and 
Miurin,  1992;  Begg  and Partes,  1992).  10 
10.  Begg  and  Partes  (1992)  point  out  that  the  "bad 
debts"  problem,  often  linked  to  financial  repression,  is 
familiar  from  the  experience  of less  developed countries  and 
middle-income  industrialising countries.  However  in central 
eastern  Europe  the  problem  is  larger  and  qualitatively 
different  (as  inherited  bad  debts  bear  no  relation  to  real 
assets  and  profitability and  debtors  are usually  "too big to 
fail").  Begg  and  Partes  claim  that,  as  both  debtors  and 
creditors  are  state  owned,  bad  debts  clearing  has  no  effect 
on  the  consolidated  balance  sheet  of  the  public  sector. 
They  emphasise  that  "Since  most  activities  in  Central  and 
Eastern  Europe  were  in  the  public  sector,  it  must  be 
possible,  with  the  stroke  of  a  pen,  to  cancel  debts  of  one 
public  agency  to  another  without  affecting  the  consolidated 
wealth  of  the  public  sector.  Contrary  to  the  frequently 
8 The  scale  of  bad  loans  is difficult to  assess  with  any 
precision  but  is  probably  large:  according  to  external 
audits  of  the  Polish  state  banks,  carried  out  by  foreign 
accountancy  firms·  in  June  1991,  bad  loans  in  state  banks 
ranged  from  24%  to  68%  of  assets  (Eastwood  and  Durski, 
1992).  A  relatively  large  amount  of  bad  loans, 
unfortunately,  have  been  accumulated also  by  a  number  of  new 
private  banks;11  a  Polish  private  bank,  the  Bank  Handlowy 
Przemyslowy  of  Katowice,  recently  collapsed.  New  bad  loans 
by  new  private  banks,  however,  raise  problems  substantially 
different  from  the  "cleansing"  of  old  loans  from  old  state 
banks:  the  case  for possible state support rests  on  the  need 
to protect depositors  rather than  on  the  needs  of enterprise 
financial  restructuring. 
In  the  CSFR  the  problem  of  bad  loans  has  been  handled 
partly  by  setting  up  a  new  Consolidation  Bank,  to  take  over 
a  certain amounts  of  those  loans:  in Bulgaria  a  more  broadly 
based  institution,  the  Bank  Consolidation  Company,  has  been 
set  up  with  a  view  to  undertake  the  reorganisation  and 
privatisation  of  banks  as  well  as  the  management  of  bad 
loans.12 
held  view  that action  on  debts  may  have  adverse  consequences 
for  the  public  finances,  it  is  simple  arithmetic  to 
demonstrate  that  its  impact  effect  is  zero  provided  the 
public  finances  were  beinq  properly  measured"  (emphasis  in 
the  text).  The  reasoning  is  unimpeachable:  nevertheless, 
the  recapitalisation of state  owned  banks  after the  clearing 
of  bad  debts  is  still  a  burden  on  public  sector  borrowing 
requirements:  the  state  capital  injection  into  banks  will 
not  be  fully  recouped  by  the  state  through  additional 
revenue  from  bank  privatisation  when  the  net  worth  of  banks 
before  such  an  injection is negative.  Of  course  the  public 
sector  borrowing  requirement  necessary  to  perform  this 
operation  is  only  the  manifestation  of  liabilities  incurred 
a  long  time  ago  by  a  previous  economic  and  political  system. 
It is  not  a  net  cost  of  transition,  but  it still is  a  cost 
to be  financed  today,  nevertheless  (see Nuti,  1992b). 
11.  Apparently  in  Poland  the  imposition  of  credit 
ceilings  on  state owned  commercial  banks  has  allowed  private 
banks  to  "increase  their  imprudent  lending  even  faster  than 
the  non-bank  deposits  allowed,  because  the  rapid  expanding 
interbank credits  from  government  owned  commercial  banks  and 
the  lack  of  adequate  banking  supervision"  (Sommariva  and 
Miurin,  1992). 
12.  In  the  CSFR  the  Consolidation  Bank  took  over  110 
bn  crowns  of  loans  by  banks  to  enterprises  for  "perpetual 
credits  for  inventories"  which  had  no  fixed  maturity  and  a 
low  fixed  interest  rate  (6%):  see  Begg  and  Partes,  1992. 
The  Bulgarian  Bank  Consolidation  Company  has  taken  over  bank 
shares  formerly  owned  by state enterprises. 
9 The  problem  of  bad  loans  is  not  resolved  simply  by 
concentrating  the  monitoring  and  management  of  bad  loans  in 
a  single  new  organisation;  the  non-performing  assets 
transferred  to  the  Consolidation  Bank  may  be  worth  next  to 
nothing,  but their transfer still represents  a  net deduction 
from  bank  assets,  thus  making  the  negative-worth  of  banks 
even  more  highly negative.  Simple cancellation of debts,  as 
suggested  for  instance  by  Dornbusch  1990,  is  not  a  solution 
either,  as  presumably  bank  debts  (deposits)  would  not  be 
cancelled and banks would not  improve their position. 
The  solution  must  necessarily  be  a  recapitalisation  of 
those  banks,  as  a  necessary  step  prior  to  their 
privatisation  (see  Begg  and  Portes  1992)  but  indeed  as  a 
desirable  step  regardless  of  privatisation.  This  can  take 
the  form  of  banks  swapping  their  bad  loans  for  government 
bonds  (as it was  also partially done  in  CSFR  in 1991,  and it 
is  proposed  to  do  in  Romania)13;  prior to  privatisation  the 
"bad"  liabilities of the  banking sector must  be  "socialised" 
in  this  way  (see  Calvo  and  Frankel,  1991).  Such 
recapitalisation  of  banks  would  have  to  be,  and  to  be  seen 
to  be,  a  once  and  for  all step,  "not  a  government  pledge  to 
underwrite  banks  in  perpetuity"  (Begg  and  Portes,  1992); 
unfortunately  the  "socialisation"  of  bad  liabilities  may 
have to  include  loans  extended during  the first stage  of  the 
transition,  before the new  standards are fully established. 
4.  Fundinq private acquisitions. 
An  obvious  role  of  banks  in  the  privatisation  process 
is  that  of  making  loans  to  the  public  in  order  to  finance 
their purchase  of state assets;  whether  such  loans  should  be 
made  only  to  the  domestic  public  or  also  to  foreign 
investors  is  a  matter  primarily  for  political  choice.  This 
role  applies  to  both  11 small  pri  vatisation  11  (land,  shops, 
hotels  and  catering  establishments,  housing)  and  in  the 
"large  scale  privatisation"  of  state  enterprises,  although 
different  intermediaries  are  bound  to  be  involved.  For 
instance,  financing  the purchase  of  owner  occupied houses  is 
best  performed  by  institutions  like  building  societies; 
financing  the  purchase  of  financial  assets  through  loans 
13.  Begg  and  Portes  ( 1991)  suggest  recapitalisation 
through  the  issue  to  banks  of  indexed  bonds  (which  "would 
raise  the  credibility  of  monetary  policy")  or  of  short  term 
Treasury bills,  instead of  "long  nominal  bonds  vulnerable to 
expropriation  through  future  inflation".  However, 
presumably  the  interest  rate  differentials  on  indexed  and 
non  indexed  bonds,  and  on  short  versus  long  term  government 
bonds,  or  in  any  case  the  banks'  freedom  to  restructure 
their portfolio,  would  make  the  type  of  bonds  to  be  used  in 
bank recapitalisation largely a  matter of indifference. 
10 secured  by  the  assets  purchased  is  an  ordinary  banking 
operation,  whereas  the purchase  of large  scale share  stakes, 
or of  entire enterprises,  is more  in  the  nature  of  merchant 
banking. 
In  an  economy  with  a  s~ttled  ownership  regime  current 
savings  may  be  capable  of  financing  new  issues  of  bonds 
(including state bonds)  and  shares;  in  a  economy  privatising 
state  assets  this  may  not  be  enough,  other  than  for  share 
prices  drastically  lower  than  the  underlying  value  of 
assets;  in  a  rapidly  privatising  economy  this  is  certainly 
not  enough.  True,  in transitional  countries  there  is  often 
at  first  a  currency  overhang, 14  but  experience  has  shown 
that  privatisation  of  state  assets  is  too  slow  to  absorb 
such  an  overhang,  when  it is present  and  large,  fast  enough 
in  the  early stage  of  a  stabilisation programme.  If such  a 
programme  is  urgent,  as  it  instantly  becomes  with  the 
political  changeover,  the  overhang  has  to  be  absorbed 
through price rises,  after which  the  real value  of the  stock 
of  liquid  assets  in  the  hand  of  the  public,  already  small 
relatively  to  the  value  of  state  assets  to  be  privatised, 
becomes  even more  inadequate. 
This  paradox,  of  excess  liquidity  followed  by  liquidity 
shortage  in  rapid  succession  in  the  first  stages  of  the 
transition,  can  be  handled  in  three  possible  ways:  credible 
detailed  announcements  of  the  privatisation  programme;  free 
handouts  of  state  assets  to  employees  and  to  the  general 
public;  ad-hoc credit. 
.  Credible  and  detailed  announcements  would  induce  the 
public  to  voluntarily  hold  larger  liquid  assets  than  they 
would  otherwise,  in anticipation of  subsequent  investment  in 
privatised assets,  thus  reducing  or eliminating  any  monetary 
overhang  for  a  lower  rate  of  inflation,  and  reducing  the 
subsequent  liquidity  shortage  for  privatisation  finance.  In 
view  of  experience  in  a  recent  past  and  in  other  countries, 
when  and  where  the  speed  and  methods  of  privatisation  have 
changed  rapidly  and  frequently,  this  kind  of  announcements 
14  The  actual  size  and  presence  of  monetary  over~ang 
in  the  1970s  have  been  the  object  of  controversy,  s1nce 
measurement  presumes  a  reliable  estimate  of  what  the  demand 
for  money  would  be  if current  prices  were  market  clearing; 
but  there  is  generalised  consensus  both  about  its  presence 
in  the  1980s  and  on  its  significant  size,  as  witnessed  by 
large  price  differentials  between  the  official  level  and 
that  prevailing  in  secondary  retrading  ("black"  or  grey 
markets)  and  by  a  number  of  alternative  indicators  of  true 
inflationary  pressure  (see  Nuti,  1986).  Monetary  assets 
appear  to  be  large  relatively to market  economies  in  normal 
conditions:  for  instance,  in the  Soviet  Union  at  the  end  of 
1991  the  liquid  assets  of  households  and  enterprises 
exceeded  1  trillion roubles,  equivalent to almost  as  much  as 
its GOP  in the previous twelve months. 
11 would  not  be  credible  even  if  governments  had  a  clear  and 
agreed policy,  which  is not often the case. 
Free  hand  outs,  or  "privatisation without  capital"  (for 
details,  see  Blommestein,  1992)  are  not  a  convincing 
alternative  (see  Nuti,  1991a).  There  is  no  such  a  thing  as 
a  free  portfolio  of  assets:  citizens  will  have  to  pay  for 
their  supposedly  free  shares  through  higher  taxes. 
Expectations  are  bound  to  be  disappointed:  President 
Walesa' s  1990  pre-electoral  promise  of  100  mn  zlotys  hand 
out  to  every  Pole,  raised  to  500  mn  in  June  1992,  is  a 
delusion.  If  share  entitlements  or  actual  shares  are 
transferable,  the  scheme  amounts  to  a  distribution  of  cash 
(equal  to  the  total  or  partial  subsidy  on  the  distribution 
of  shares),  which  is  _bound  to  encourage  consumption 
expenditure  and  revive  inflation.  If  the  entitlements  and 
the  actual  shares  are  not  transferable,  owners  are  being 
prevented  from  transacting  in  the  market  and  therefore  the 
control  function  of private  shareholdings  goes  by the  board. 
In  addition,  the  conversion  of vouchers  into  shares  may  run 
into  unnecessary  complications  and  inefficiencies, 
especially  if  the  vouchers  are  denominated  not  in  monetary 
units but  in special units  such as  "investment points",  with 
bidding  processes  truncated  before  equilibrium  prices  are 
reached  (see  Svejnar  1992,  on  the  oddities  of  the  CSFR 
voucher  scheme).15  The  choice  among  the  many  ways  in  which 
such  mass  privatisation  schemes  16  can  be  conducted  is bound 
15.  At  first  the  EBRD  appeared  to  favour  voucher 
schemes,  but  its  position  has  now  changed:  "  voucher 
schemes  are  likely  to  be  complicated,  they  do  not 
properly  address  valuation  and  restructuring  issues, 
they  turn  out  to  slow  down  the  privatisation  process 
compared  to  more  pragmatic  and  traditional  approaches  (such 
as  direct  sales  and  auction) ...  "  (Aghion  and  Burgess, 
1992).  Giving  away  shares  in  state  enterprises  has  been 
proposed  on  the  ground  that  their value  is  i)  difficult  to 
calculate;  ii)  in  many  instances  negative  (the  instance  of 
Treuhandanstalt,  which  is expected to end  up  incurring  large 
scale liabilities  instead of  net  revenue  from  privatisation, 
has  been  quoted  as  an  example) •  However,  Treuandanstal  t 
loans  and  guarantees  are  not  necessarily  net  liabilities; 
the  valuation  does  not  (indeed  should  not)  be  done 
administratively  but  can  be  done  by  the  market  in  the  sale 
process;  it  is  implausible  that  the  entire  state  capital 
stock  should  have  a  negative  present value;  if it did,  free 
handouts  would  have  no  advantage  on sales. 
16.  What  proportion  of  state  assets  should  be  so 
distributed?  Should  a  portion  be  set aside  for  restitution 
to old  owners,  how  much  and  for  whom?  Should all citizen be 
included  in  the  scheme,  or  should  the  under-age  or  the 
expatriate be  excluded  (and,  if so,  from  what  date)?  Should 
the  distribution  be  graded  according  to  age?  Should  there 
be  a  registration  fee,  and  how  large?  Should  the  handout 
take the  form  of  a  certificate,  or of  a  simple  registration, 
or  an  investment  account?  Should  the  allocation  be 
12 to  lead  to  debates  that  slow  down  the  process; 
implementation  is  also  time  consuming.  In  any  case,  the 
quick transfer of  ownership titles should not  be  expected to 
introduce  equally  quickly  the  incentive  role  of  asset 
markets.17  Ultimately,  the  only  justifications  for  voucher 
schemes  are  "based  essentially  on  political  considerations 
and  the  reduction  of  incentive  barriers  to  privatisation" 
(Aghion  and  Burgess,  1992).  such  schemes  are  politically 
respectable  and,  as  long  as  they  are  monetised  and  simple, 
quickly  executed,  counterbalanced  by  taxation,  accompanied 
by  other  forms  of  privatisation,  and  are  not  expected  to 
implement  capitalism  at  a  stroke,  can  be  quite  harmless  in 
the short run  and  fairly effective in the medium-long  run. 
The  alternative  or  combined  solution  to  the  problem  of 
privatisation  finance  is  the  extension  of  ad-hoc  credit, 
both  for the purchase  of  shares  in state enterprises  and  for 
any  form  of  privatisation  ("one-by-one",  direct  sales, 
liquidations,  buy-outs,  leasings).18  Usually  bank  loans  for 
the  financing  of  share  purchases  are  speculative  in  nature; 
transferable?  Should  there  be  one  round,  or  more?  Should 
individual  allocations  be  denominated  in  monetary  units,  or 
in  other  intermediate  units?  Should  shares  be  allocated at 
random,  or  should  a  market  immediately  develop  through  the 
initial  choice  of  investors?  Should  state assets  be  vested 
in  investment  trusts,  whose  certificates  would  then  be 
distributed  to  (or  purchased  by)  the  public?  Should  the 
various  state  enterprises  be  distributed  among  investment 
trusts  at  random,  or  through  a  bidding  process  (in  which 
case,  how  many  iterations should be  allowed,  if any,  for  the 
bidding  to  lead  to,  or  approach,  an  equilibrium  allocation 
at  market  clearing  prices?)..  Who  should  manage  the 
investment  trusts,  and  on  what  terms?  Should  shares  (or 
certificates)  be  immediately  transferable?  The  number  of 
combinations  and  permutations  is  inordinately  large;  no 
wonder  debates,  decisions  and  amendments  take  years,  not 
months. 
17.  "Privatisation  is  not  merely  the  transfer  of 
property  rights  from  the  state  to  the  private  sector.  A 
crucial  consideration  is  whether  this  transfer  leads  to 
effective control by private owners"  (OECD  1992). 
18.  Staszek  Gomulka  had  put  forward  a  scheme  of 
delayed  privatisation,  with  a  special  role  for  banks:  state 
enterprise shares  would  be  first entrusted to the  management 
of  banks,  then,  subsequently  and  gradually,  banks  would  be 
privatised  and  with  them  also  the  state  enterprise  shares. 
For this to be  the  case,  however,  share ownership  would  have 
had  to  be  transferred to  banks  in the  first place,  in  which 
case  we  are  back  to  the  same  scheme  entrusting  shares  to 
investment  funds  (discussed  by  Blommestein,  1992),  with 
banks  in place of  investment  funds. 
13 rather  than  involving  banks  in  a  time  consuming  and  costly 
scrutiny  of  individual  purchase  plans  it may  be  better  to 
grant  to  all  citizen  limited  investment  credit,  possibly 
leveraged  and  in  any  case  secured  by  the  shares  purchased 
with that credit.19 
It is  important  that  the  state  should  provide  all  the 
liquidity  necessary  to  the  operation,  in  order  not  to  crowd 
out  real  investment  and  unduly  depress  share  prices;  at the 
same  time  it is  important  not  to  recycle  any  of  the  state 
receipts  funded  through  this  credit  (Nuti,  1991a).  The 
neutrality of the operation is essential. 
Net  sales of state assets  have  a  deflationary effect on 
money  supply,  like  any  open  market  operation  of  the  Central 
Bank.  Some  deflation  may  actually  be  one  of  the  government 
target  (although  there  are  now  indication  that  transitional 
economies  may  have  gone  too  far  in  this  respect:  see  Calvo 
and  Coricelli,  1992,  on  the  output  losses  due  to  credit 
squeeze  in  the  central  eastern  European  countries  in  their 
stabilisation  programmes);  beyond  the  desired  rate  of 
deflation,  the deflationary effect of privatisation of state 
assets  must  be  neutralised,  through  an  injection  of 
liquidity  by  the  Central  Bank  into  the  banking  system.  At 
the  same  time,  such  a  liquidity  injection  should  be 
sterilised  as  soon  as  it  is  drawn,  through  use  of 
privatisation receipts to retire government  debt  towards  the 
public or towards  the Central  Bank. 
s.  Financing capacity restructuring. 
Much  of  the  productive  capacity of  state enterprises  is 
inappropriate,  with  respect to  relative prices  of  inputs  and 
outputs,  to  domestic  and  world  demand,  to  the  needs  of 
environment  protection.  capacity  restructuring  may  be 
undertaken  before  or  after  privatisation,  and  therefore  can 
be  "decoupled"  from  financial  restructuring  of  enterprises 
and  bank.  It is less  important to restructure capacity than 
it  is  to  restructure  enterprise  finances  before 
privatisation:  it is  less  practicable  because  it takes  more 
time  than  financial  restructuring  and  better  judgement; 
concern  for  capacity  restructuring  should  not  delay  the 
process  of  privatisation.  20  The  financial  requirements  of 
enterprise  capacity  restructuring  involve  cost-saving, 
19.  Investment  checking  accounts  granted  to  citizens 
for  bidding  in the privatisation process  have  been  announced 
in  Belarus;  it is  easy  to  make  them  an  automatic  overdraft 
facility instead of a  grant. 
2 0.  With  reference  to  one  of  the  questions  raised  in 
OECD  1992,  this means  that it should be  possible  and  perhaps 
desirable  to  decouple  financial  restructuring  from 
industrial restructuring. 
14 quality-improving,  energy-saving,  pollution-reducing 
investment,  which might restore enterprise competitiveness. 
Short  term  profits  or  even  losses  are  not  always  a 
reliable  indication  of  medium  and  long  term  economic 
viability of an  enterprise.  The  difficult task of banks,  in 
applying  credit-worthiness  criteria,  is  that  of 
distinguishing between three kinds of enterprises: 
i)  negative  value  added  enterprises  incapable  of 
restructuring  themselves  so  as  to  positive  value  added 
(calculating value  added at international prices):  these  are 
moribund  enterprises  artificially  kept  alive  through  life 
support,  to be abandoned: 
ii)  enterprises  which,  though  ill  are  capable  of 
convalescing  into  financial  viability,  i.e.  not  only  into 
positive  value  added  but  into  prospective  profitability: 
resources should be concentrated in these enterprises: 
iii)  those  enterprises  which,  at  once  or  after  some 
short  term  restructuring,  are  capable  of  producing  positive 
value  added  but not  enough  to be profitable:  these  should  be 
receiving  either  temporary  tariff  protection  or  budgetary 
investment  funds  andjor  wage  subsidies,  but,  most 
emphatically not credit  (see section above). 
For  enterprise  economic  performance  to  be  assessed  by 
banks,  it  is  necessary  that  the  burden  of  taxation  should 
also  be  related  to  performance,  instead  of  consisting  of 
lumpsums  or being related to variables other than profits or 
turnover  (such  as  revalued  historical  capital,  as  in  the 
Polish  so-called  "dividend",  or  wages,  as  in  the  Polish 
excess-wage  tax  or  "Popiwek") .  Moreover  taxation  should  be 
non discriminatory between the private and the state sector. 
In  the  allocation  of  credit,  some  rationing  may  be 
appropriate:  this  is  standard  practice  even  in  western 
economies,  where  it  has  been  argued  that  financial  market 
clearing  via  the  interest  rate  may  actually  lead  to 
"perverse selection"  (Stiglitz). 
There  is  no  reason  why  banks  should  not  be  allowed  to 
hold  significant  equity  stakes  in  enterprises  to  be 
privatised,  becoming  indirectly  involved  in  the 
restructuring:  equity holding  is bound  to  have  the  advantage 
of  longer  term  time  horizon  with  respect  to  lending  (and 
would  enhance  market  constraints  on  managerial  discretion: 
see below,  sections  7  and 8). 
6.  Financinq  investaent  in  new  capacity  and  workinq 
capital. 
Privatisation  debates  have  been  focussing  primarily  on 
the  transfer  of  state  assets  to  a  wider  public.  Yet  the 
adjustment  of  inappropriate  capacity  is  more  likely  to  be 
undertaken  through  new  ventures:  Herbert  Levine  emphasises 
15 this  point  thus:  "The  selection  process  in  economic 
evolution  •..  tends to  favor  new  firms  and  small  firms  which 
are  not  encumbered  by  strongly  entrenched  routines.  Such 
firms  are  able  to  respond  more  flexibly  to  environmental 
changes .••. The  best  hope  lies with  the  entry  of  new  small 
and  medium  size  firms,  especially  in  the  early  years  of  a 
market  system,  in  the  consumer  goods  industry,  so  that  the 
people  will  see  early  evidence  of  the  benefits  of  the 
market.  For  this  to  occur,  the  early  development  of 
appropriate  financial  institutions  is  crucial.  The 
successful  entry  of  new  firms  requires  the  provision  of 
capital  by  financial  institutions"  (Levine,  1991;  emphasis 
in the text) . 
Different  types  of  institutions  can  be  envisaged:  a 
state  development  bank,  for  instance  aiming  at  mobilising 
entrepreneurship  through  financing  cooperative  enterprises, 
and  investment  in  depressed  regions;  merchant  banks, 
launching  new  share  issues;  and  commercial  banks  with  both 
investment  and  commercial  credit functions. 
A  number  of  difficulties  appear  in  this  respect. 
First,  stock  exchanges  in  transitional  economies  are  thin 
and  highly  speculative  21;  the  number  of  financial  products 
needs  extending,  to  include  for  instance  options,  warrants, 
futures,  interest  futures.  Thinness  makes  for  both 
instability  and  for  inability to  capture  economies  of  scale 
in broadening the range of financial  products. 
Second,  the  context of  banking  operations,  in the  first 
stages  of  reform  and  stabilisation  programmes,  is  usually  a 
fairly  drastic  credit  contraction  in  real  terms,  mostly  due 
to  a  combination  of  nominal  money  targeting  and  of  actual 
inflation  exceeding  expected  inflation,  i.e.  a  contraction 
of  enterprise  liquidity  and  of  credit  of  unwanted  severity 
(Calvo  and  Coricelli,  1992).  Output  elasticity  to  credit 
appears  to  have  been  higher  than  it  might  have  been 
expected.  These  macroeconomic  conditions  restrict  rather 
drastically  the  contribution  that  the  banking  sector  should 
be  able  to  make  to  the  privatisation  process  from  a 
microeconomic  angle.  A  corollary  is  the  need  for  fiscal 
austerity,  without  which  the  budget  deficit  is  bound  to 
crowd  investment by both private and state enterprises. 
While  estimates  of  the  eastern  and  central  European 
"financing gap",  based  primarily  on  catching-up models,  have 
been  probably  overestimated,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the 
financing  gap  is  large  relatively  to  domestic  savings  and 
foreign  exchange  requirements.  Thus  the  domestic  banking 
sector  has  an  important  role to  play  in  channelling  foreign 
capital to  domestic  (private  and  state)  enterprises,  for  the 
21.  In  Poland,  for  instance,  in  mid-1992  the  stock 
exchange  meets  twice  weekly  to process  bids  received  in  the 
intervening  periods,  handling  shares  in  thirteen  companies 
held by  120,000  investors. 
16 acquisition  of  pri  vatised  assets,  for  direct  investment  in 
enterprise equity and  for loans. 
The  EBRD  is  understood  to  be  considering  at  least 
initially  "apex"  style  loans  in  support  of  the  private 
sector.  This  involves  the  Bank  lending  under  government 
guarantee  to  a  single  institution,  normally  the  Central 
Bank,  for  lending  on  to  small  and  medium  size  private 
enterprises  (Charap,  1992).  This  procedure  is  being 
considered  in order not to  face directly the distortions  and 
risks  of  the  transition  period,  but  it  is  important  that 
loans  should  not  be  made  directly  by  the  Central  Bank,  as 
this  would  involve  a  return  to  the  old  system,  but  through 
suitable  financial  intermediaries.  In  all  instances  of 
foreign  loans  to  domestic  enterprises  (and  joint  ventures) 
it  is  important  that  borrowers  should  bear  the  cost  of 
foreign  exchange  risk,  either  directly  or  indirectly  by 
paying  domestic  financial  institutions  for  their  bearing  of 
that risk. 
7.  Hardeninq budqet constraints 
The  privatisation of  banks  can  be  expected  to  make,  by 
itself,  an  important  contribution  to  the  privatisation 
process  in  addition  to  those  discussed  above,  namely,  the 
hardening  of  budget  constraints  in the  state sector.  Janos 
Kornai • s  notion  of  "soft  budgets"  in  the  state  sector  was 
perhaps  overdone,  as  even  in centrally  planned  economies  no 
budget  was  ever  infinitely  soft,  but  the  notion  has 
substance,  in  that  it epitomises  financial  indiscipline  and 
automatic  credit.  Contractual  credit  relations  between 
private  enterprises  and  state  enterprises  should  put  an  end 
to de  facto  indexation of credit and  funding of losses. 
It is often wondered  whether privatised  banks  should  or 
should  not  lend to the state sector at all  (OECD,  1992).  As 
long  as  the  direct  "petty  tutelage"  of  enterprises  by 
central  "founding  organs"  has  been  removed,  and  state 
managers•  incentive structure duly  overhauled  (see  section  1 
above)  it  seems  desirable  that  both  types  of  enterprises 
should  be  treated  on  conditions  of  equality.  Otherwise  the 
economic  system  moves  from  excessively  loose  to  excessively 
tight  enterprise  constraints,  leading  to  undesirable  de-
capitalisation  or  the  continuation  of  grants  from  the  state 
budget  or  soft  loans  from  state banks.  Preoccupation  about 
private  access  to  credit  is  better  dealt  with  by  a 
stipulation of  a  minimum  share  of all  new  bank  credit being 
reserved  to  the  private  sector,  as  the  one/third  rule 
implemented  in Poland  in 1991  (Begg  and Portes,  1992). 
7.  constraininq manaqerial discretion. 
The  implicit  model  of  financial  reform  in  central 
eastern Europe  is the  UK-USA  system,  where  in general  equity 
is  not  held  by  banks,  but  by  a  large  number  of  private 
investors  (USA)  or  non-bank  intermediaries  (UK),  with 
17 corporate  control  exerted  indirectly  by  outsiders  through 
takeovers  bids.  It  has  been  suggested  that  a  model  more 
appropriate  to  the  centralised  and  undeveloped  financial 
systems  of  central  eastern  Europe  would  have  been  the 
German-Japanese  system  of  control  by  insiders,  with  banks 
direct  and  indirect  holdings  and  involvement  in  the  control 
of industry  (de  Cecco,  1989;  Corbett and Meyer,  1992). 
The  merits  of  German-type  supervision  of  industry  by 
banks  are  controversial  and  the  system has  come  under  strong 
criticism,  especially  in  Germany  (see  Nuti,  1989,  for  a 
review  of  the  drawbacks,  and  in  particular:  conflicting 
interests vested  in different  functions  of  banks  as  lenders, 
shareholders  and  advisors  to  investors,  their  emphasis  on 
short  term  performance  and  the  dangers  of  monopolistic 
practices).  However,  in central  eastern Europe  the  case  for 
German-Japanese  practices  is  being  supported  by  the  special 
restructuring  and  modernisation  requirements  of  enterprises 
that  are  to  be  privatised,  as  well  as  by  slow  progress  of 
privatisation  throughout  the  area,  given  the  lower 
dependence  of  this  model,  relatively  to  the  UK-USA  model, 
from  the  completion  of  privatisation.  The  German-Japanese 
model  is  certainly  feasible  in  central  eastern  Europe:  in 
general  banks  are  permitted  to  take  equity  stakes  in  other 
enterprises  22,  and  it  would  be  simple  to  allow  and 
encourage  shareholders  to  lodge  their  shares  with  banks  and 
delegate  them  to  vote;  this  could  be  a  way  of  alleviating 
the  effects  of  the  excessively  fragmented  share  ownership 
likely to result from  mass privatisation schemes. 
Of  course  the  German-Japanese  model  relies  on  a  full-
fledged  and  well  functioning  stock  exchange  and  other 
financial  markets,  and  on  a  completely  private  banking 
sector.  Thus  it  is  dubious  whether  state  banks  might 
exercise  such  a  role of  supervising  and  control,  and  whether 
the present  thinness  of  financial  market  would  allow private 
banks  to  exercise  such  functions  effectively.  Reliance  on 
managerial  control  by  banks  would  not  eliminate  the 
importance  of  privatisation  and  of  developing  financial 
markets.  Moreover,  a  distinctive  feature  of  the  German 
system is the absence  of hostile takeovers,  sometimes  costly 
but  necessary  to  establish  stock  market  discipline  on  the 
managers  of  private  companies,  through  fear  of  their 
dismissal  by  successful  bidders.  Thus  bank  control  over 
managerial  activities  would  replace  other  market  checks, 
rather than establishing an additional  form  of control.  23 
2 2  In  Poland  the  amount  of  equity  in  and  lending  to 
any  one  enterprise  is  subject to  respective  ceilings  of  25% 
and  15%  of  bank  capital,  beyond  which  NBP  approval  is 
necessary. 
23.  In  broader  sense,  this  function  of  managerial 
control  by  banks  could  be  understood  to  include  advice, 
directly  or  by  financing  access  to  specialist  advice  by 
consultants. 
18 The  opposite  development,  i.e.  ownership  of  banks  by 
enterprises,  has  also  appeared.  In  the  Yugoslav  experience 
this  practice  has  had  adverse  repercussions,  as  banks  have 
often  acted  as  instruments  of  "socialisation  of  losses", 
channelling  funds  to  shareholding  enterprises  to  finance 
loss-making  activities.24  Analogous  phenomena  have  been 
reported  for  Hungary. 25  In  the  light  of  experience,  this 
practice,  at least temporarily,  ought to be discouraged. 
9.  Pundinq  leasinqs,  buy-outs  and  takeovers. 
One  of  the  lesser  known  success  stories  of  Polish 
privatisation  has  been  the  "liquidation"  of  a  number  of 
state  enterprises  and  the  ensuing  buy-outs  (largely  on 
credit)  or  leasings  by  employees  and  managers  as  well  as 
redeployment  of  physical  assets.  This  process  has  received 
less  publicity  because  it is  not  open  to  foreign  investors 
but,  unlike  other  kinds  of  privatisation,  has  proceeded 
faster  than  anticipated  and  has  involved  over  1, ooo  state 
enterprises  (of  which  600  have  completed  the  process  by  the 
end  of  1991).  This  procedure  is  constrained  partly  by  the 
availability  of  willing  and  credible  takers,  partly  by  the 
availability  of  finance.  This  kind  of  liquidation,  also 
called  "restructuring privatisation",  is to  be  distinguished 
from  the  proceedings  applied  to  insolvent state enterprises, 
which  lead  to  privatisation  through  dispersal  and 
redeployment  of  assets;  it  is,  however,  another  track  of 
privatisation  which  requires  finance.  Both  types  have  been 
somewhat  neglected,  if  not  in  privatisation  plans,  in  the 
provision of finance. 
Finally,  one  of  the  roles  of  the  financial  system  is 
that  of  providing  the  resources  to  enable  other  forms  of 
challenges  to  the  incumbent  managerial  team  of  private 
companies,  by  easing  the  possibility  of  mergers  and 
especially  of  takeover  bids.  It has  almost  become  a  common 
place,  in official circles  in transitional  economies,  to  say 
that  what  is  most  needed  to  put  the  fear  of  god  in 
24.  on  the  Yugoslav  banking  system,  see  Dimitrievich 
and  Macesich,  1983;  on  Yugoslav  socialisation  of  losses 
through the banking  system,  see Uvalic,  1992. 
25.  "At  the  time  of  the  establishment  of  the 
commercial  banks  the  state was  a  majority  shareholder  in all 
of  them.  The  rest  of  the  shares  were  mainly  purchased  by 
state-owned  enterprises,  very  often  financed  by  loans  from 
the  bank  in  question  Thus,  representatives  of  the 
largest debtors  were  elected to sit on  the  boards  of  banks, 
making  decisions  unfavourable  to  them  extremely difficult to 
impose"  (Estrin et al.,  1992). 
19 enterprise  managers  is  a  large  scale,  spectacular 
bankruptcy.  The  time  has  come  for  official  circles to  look 
forward,  instead,  to  the  first  successful  hostile  takeover 
bid,  and to create the conditions for it to occur. 
10.  conclusions. 
In short,  there are  a  number  of important  preconditions 
for  banks  to  make  their  important  contributions  to  the 
progress  of  privatisation.  First,  all  residual  features  of 
the  monetary  and  financial  system  associated  with  central 
planning  should  be  dismantled,  such  as  the  segmentation  of 
monetary  circuits,  and  forms  of  automatic  credit  (including 
forced  credit  in  inter-enterprise  relations).  Second, 
accompanying  reforms  should  include  the  enforcement  of 
liquidation  and  bankruptcy  procedures,  the  overhauling  of 
managerial  incentives  in  the  state  sector.  the  provision  of 
a  regulatory  framework,  the  provision  of  training,  and  of  a 
suitable  infrastructure  of  communications  and  data 
processing facilities. 
In  order  to  resolve  the  paradox  of  transitional 
economies  that  of  initial  excess  liquidity  at  the 
stabilisation  stage  followed  by  liquidity  shortage  at  the 
privatisation  stage  credit  must  be  provided  to  fund 
private purchases  of state assets,  but not  recycled  into the 
state  budget.  This  seems  preferable  to  popular  schemes  of 
"voucher"  mass privatisation "without capital". 
The  financial  restructuring  of  enterprises,  and  of 
banks  themselves,  involves  the  clearing  of  bad  loans 
(including  that  part  of  interenterprise  arrears  which 
consists  of  bad  loans)  and  the  recapitalisation  of 
enterprises  and  banks;  it  is  a  necessary  step  prior  to 
privatisation;  it  involves  a  current  budgetary  allocation, 
in  spite  of  being  the  delayed  manifestation  of  budgetary 
losses  incurred in a  distant past. 
The  financing  of  capacity  restructuring,  whether  before 
or  after  privatisation,  involves  a  difficult  classification 
of  enterprises  in  order  to  decide  whether  or  not  to  fund 
cost-saving,  quality-improving,  energy-saving,  pollution-
reducing  investment,  which  might  restore  enterprise 
competitiveness. 
The  early  privatisation  of  banks  can  be  expected  to 
make,  by  itself,  an  important  contribution  to  the 
privatisation  process  in  addition  to  those  discussed  above, 
namely,  the  hardening  of  budget  constraints  in  the  state 
sector. 
Through  direct  equity  holding  and  through  proxi-voting 
on  behalf  of  clients,  as  in  the  German-type  banking  system, 
banks  can  exercise  control  over  managerial  discretion  - a 
function  made  all  more  important  by  the  special 
restructuring  and  modernisation  requirements  of  enterprises 
20 that  are  to  be  privatised,  as  well  as  by  slow  progress  of 
privatisation throughout the area. 
The  adjustment  of  inappropriate  capacity is more  likely 
to  be  undertaken  through  new  ventures;  different 
institutions  can  be  involved,  such  as  development  banks, 
merchant  banks,  investment  and  commercial  banks; 
difficulties  are  the  thinness  and  speculative  nature  of 
stock  exchanges  in transltional  economies,  associated with  a 
small  range  of  financial  products,  and  the  deflationary 
context of  macroeconomic  policies during the  early stages  of 
the transition. 
Last  but  not  least,  banks  can  contribute  to 
privatisation  progress  through  funding  leasings, 
redeployment  of  physical  assets  (made  available  by 
bankruptcy  procedures  and  by  enterprises  subjected  to  a 
credit squeeze),  buy-outs  by  managers  and  employees  of state 
enterprises,  as  well  as  mergers  and  especially  take-over 
bids  which  appear  to  be  essential  to  the  enforcement  of 
market discipline over managerial discretion. 
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